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BOOK REVIEWS 
Naturalism and Religion, by Kai Nielsen. Prometheus Books, 2001. Pp. 506. 
$40 (cloth) 
MARK WYNN, University of Exeter 
In this collection of essays (old and new), Kai Nielsen offers a characteristi-
cally clear and forthright formulation of a perspective for which he is 
already well known. There is not much in the book that engages in detail 
with recent developments in analytic philosophy of religion; indeed, 
Nielsen comments that because of its habitual neglect of certain questions, 
philosophy of religion in this style fails to make any serious demand upon 
our attention: "I suppose we could analytically reconstruct and conceptual-
ly clarify Mary Baker Eddy's metaphysical tract too, but that would hardly 
enhance interest in it or further our understanding of the significance of 
religion. These analytical philosopher-theologians need first, against the 
antimetaphysical arguments of Wittgenstein, Davidson, Rorty, and 
Putnam, to give us some reason to think that there is in the sorts of things 
they are doing something significant" (p. 20). A second, related difficulty 
for mainstream analytic philosophy of religion is that it is "very rationalis-
tic"; rather than worrying about new versions of the traditional proofs, 
"what is crucial to face instead is whether we need a belief, however over-
whelmed with intellectual impediments, in a Jewish, Christian or Islamic 
God to make sense of our lives and to live really human lives" (p. 21). In 
these remarks, Nielsen sets two kinds of challenge for contemporary philo-
sophical theology: to confront the difficulties inherent in any kind of meta-
physical claim, and to consider whether religious commitment can be 
understood, and perhaps justified in some degree, by reference to its con-
tribution to human flourishing. Let's take these challenges in tum. 
Nielsen evidently thinks it rather obvious that a metaphysically commit-
ted kind of religious belief is intellectually defective. Indeed, thinking in 
particular of the metaphysical dimension of religious belief, he comments: 
"I remain utterly flabbergasted that reflective, intelligent, and informed 
people ... can be believers" (p. 393). Naturally Nielsen wonders whether 
his inability to understand the commitments of 'intelligent and informed' 
people raises a question about whether he has fully understood what is at 
stake here. Even so, the very obviousness of the case for atheism, from his 
point of view, seems at times to get in the way of a detailed presentation of 
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the requisite arguments. Quite a lot of the time, Nielsen's case proceeds by 
allusion to what are taken to be the established findings of other philoso-
phers (Hume, Kant and the quartet of Wittgenstein et al cited above figure 
largely). In this spirit he wonders: "Must we continue to redo ... the work 
that Hume and Kant did so well before us? Should we continue to play the 
role of Philo? Standing where we stand now to do any of these things 
seems to be extremely Quixotic" (p 67). 
In general terms, Nielsen's stance is that theism comes in two varieties, 
the anthropomorphic variety (taking God to be some sort of Olympian 
entity) and the non anthropomorphic: the first has been falsified, and the 
second is incoherent (p. 33). So even if the stars were to spell out "God 
exists" (reading "God" nonanthropomorphically), this would no more 
help than if they were to spell out "procrastination drinks melancholy"; in 
such a case, "we know that something has shaken our world, but we know 
not what" (p. 279). As one would expect, Nielsen's case against nonanthro-
porn orphic theism has at times a verificationist feel. For instance, he com-
ments that (by comparison with judgements such as "Britain is indepen-
dent of Germany"), "to say that something is independent of the world has 
no such clear sense or - so at least it seems - any sense. How do we identi-
fy that something is independent of the world?" (p. 474) But elsewhere, he 
is careful to argue that some strands of his case for naturalism are free from 
verificationist assumptions, and he acknowledges that verificationism can 
be only part of a larger case against theism. Here he offers this retraction of 
his earlier views: "What we need to see, and what I for a long time did not 
see, is that the verificationist arguments do not play the central role in the 
critique of religion that I, and many others, took them to play" (p. 486). A 
number of arguments establish, Nielsen thinks, the simple contradictori-
ness of key theistic ideas, so freeing his case from over-reliance on verifica-
tionist assumptions. For instance, he rejects the notion of an "infinite indi-
vidual" on these grounds: "Something could not be an individual unless she 
or it were differentiated from other individuals or things. But something 
that is infinite cannot (logically cannot) be so differentiated .... for some-
thing which is infinite is not bounded" (p. 473, Nielsen's emphasis). 
Similarly, "We do not understand 'made out of nothing.' That at least 
sounds like a contradiction in terms. To make something, even a tune, to 
say nothing of a pie, a ship, or a proof, is to make it out of something" (p. 
474). It is worth noting that it is not only theism that falls foul of Nielsen's 
strictures; so also does a claim such as "physical objects exist," for: "What 
empirical evidence could prove or disprove it?" (p. 448) 
What should we make of this case? While in admiration of the clarity 
and robustness of its formulation, and the range of its references to the 
philosophical literature, I find Nielsen's stance at times overconfident, and 
dependent upon overgeneralizing or in other ways oversimplifying claims 
about what religious belief involves. For example, leaving aside the fact 
that a long tradition of philosophical theology has wondered about the 
sense in which God may be adequately characterized as an "individual," is 
it so obvious that the notion of infinity as it operates here signifies some-
thing like "all encompassing" or "all inclusive"; given suitable spelling out, 
that would make for a contradiction, but shouldn't this just alert us to the 
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need to think harder about what theists have meant by "infinite"? There 
are, certainly, some forms of theism (for example, "first cause" theism) 
which seem to invite objections of broadly this kind; but doesn't this sug-
gest that we need to distinguish between kinds of theism, and the sense in 
which they speak of God as "infinite," with greater care than Nielsen does 
here? Similarly, the argument against the notion of creation out of nothing 
seems overquick. Theists themselves have often challenged the coherence 
of notions which are not straightforwardly contradictory (such as the 
notion of an uncaused event), so they have reason to have some sympathy 
for the sort of project in which Nielsen is engaged here; but in these cases 
too, the alleged incoherence is not just obvious. And if Nielsen's principles 
commit him to the thought that "physical objects exist" is not factually 
meaningful, then some at least will conclude: so much the worse for the 
principles. Even Nielsen's treatment of the case of the stars seems overcon-
fident. This example seems mostly comical, but if nothing else, perhaps 
such an event ought to make us think anew about our capacity to assess a 
priori the limits of metaphysical possibility. 
What of the second strand of Nielsen's case, which on his view address-
es issues more deserving of discussion? We want to know why it is that 
theism is unfit to contribute to human flourishing. Part of the problem 
seems to lie with the tendency of believers to seek certainty: "Here we can 
see a crucial difference between a religious stance and an utterly secular 
one, and again we find good reasons here for being secularists. It is a cul-
tural achievement to be able to abandon the quest for certainty" (p. 66). 
More seriously perhaps, Nielsen supposes that "a Christian morality is 
very different from a secular one" and that it is "irresponsible" to advocate 
such a morality for: "Such indiscriminate love of our enemies or to see no 
one as our enemy can only lead to grave harm for us" (pp. 455-6). In place 
of this ideal, Nielsen offers "mutual reciprocity." Here again, the case sure-
ly invites elaboration. Do all varieties of religious belief aim at certainty? 
And even where they do aim at certainty, do they understand the notion in 
the same way? Nielsen's case seems to presuppose an identification of reli-
gious certainty with something like fanaticism, but here again it is not diffi-
cult to find a more sympathetic reading of the notion as it has informed 
religious practice. Of course, Nielsen recognizes in principle the need to 
attend to different forms of religious belief (and he makes a similar move 
himself, on p. 98, when defending naturalism from an overgeneralizing 
charge of fostering a "tragic vision"), but his conception of the sort of life 
that is consistent with religious commitment still seems somewhat truncat-
ed. Similarly, there are various understandings of what it means to "love 
one's enemy," not all of them (many of them?) implying (as Nielsen seems 
to suppose) passive accommodation of the wishes of aggressors. 
Even so, there is much that "philosopher-theologians" can learn from 
this book. Notably, while Nielsen advocates naturalism, it is emphatically a 
non-scientistic kind of naturalism, one that remains open to the "norma-
tive" dimension of human life, a dimension that believers too will want to 
safeguard against the encroachments of familiar kinds of reductionism. 
Similarly, Nielsen upholds (against "relativism") the possibility of dialogue 
across traditions (pp. 411-14). This view suggests that appeal to "revela-
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tion" need not after all imply ethnocentrism or the arbitrary privileging of 
one tradition over others (contrary to what Nielsen himself maintains) 
(p.67). On~ these issues, in spite of himself, Nielsen provides some helpful 
pointers to the shape of a more acute philosophical theology. 
The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003. Pp. 292. $32.95 (paper). 
JEANINE DILLER, Independent Scholar 
With thirteen previously unpublished essays by prominent philoso-
phers, Copan and Moser argue in this volume that theism "better resolves 
major philosophical questions than do its alternatives, including its most 
influential intellectual rival, naturalism" (3). The argument comes in three 
stages. Part I of the book consists of preliminary considerations designed 
to ready both the mind and the spirit to consider a sustained argument for 
theism. Part II is the positive piece of this argument and the core of the 
book. Like Swinburne's The Existence of God, the work of Part II is meant to 
comprise a cumulative case--the arguments presented are "to be consid-
ered not in isolation from, but in combination with, one another" (9). Part 
III presents responses to two objections to theism: the argument from inco-
herence and the problem of evil. 
Let me begin by examining Davis' discussion of the ontological argu-
ment, and some related content from Taliaferro's discussion of the coher-
ence of theism. Davis sets himself the manageable and useful task of reply-
ing to Michael Martin's criticisms of Anselm's and Plantinga's versions of 
the argument. I will focus here just on his treatment of Martin's critiques 
of Anselm. 
One of Martin's complaints is that, even if existence is a predicate, it 
does not add to the greatness of things for, e.g., undesirable things. Davis' 
reply is ingenious. He suggests that we read the term "greatness" in tlLe 
argument as "power, ability, or freedom of action," even if this is not all 
that Anselm might have meant by it, because this notion "at least has a 
chance of making the ontological argument work" (98). This reading guar-
antees, contra Martin, that "exists" is a great-making property, since an 
existing thing will necessarily, for better or worse, have more power than 
the mere concept of this thing (100). 
Davis' "power" reading of "great" also helps him respond to Martin's 
second criticism, from Gaunilo, that he can construct "parallel ontological 
arguments" to prove the existence of the greatest conceivable lost island, 
etc. Davis develops a dilemma to argue that there can be no such things. 
First, if we try to conceive the greatest conceivable lost island "in terms that 
islands can possibly have, properties like temperature, the beauty of the 
scenery," and so on, "these properties have no intrinsic maximums ... so 
there logically can be no 'greatest conceivable lost island'." But if instead 
we try to conceive the island in a wider sense of "conceive," and allow it to 
take on predicates that islands cannot possibly have, then "the greater we 
